Achieving the Positive Life Through Negative Reinforcement

Based on the three-contingency model of performance management, I make the following argument: (1) Often, we fail to behave as we should because the natural contingencies supporting appropriate behavior are ineffective; the natural contingencies involve outcomes for each individual response that are either too small, though of cumulative significance, or outcomes that are too improbable. The delay of the outcome is essentially irrelevant. The psychodynamic model of the cognitive motivational theorists provides a poor explanation for why we fail to behave as we should. (2) The performance-management contingencies in organizational behavior management (OBM) must usually involve deadline-induced aversive control, even when they are based on powerful reinforcers. Furthermore, such performance management succeeds only to the extent that that the person behavioral history, “Jewish mother,” has inculcated an appropriate value system. Wiegand and Geller’s critique of the necessity of the use of aversive control fails to take into account the necessity of deadlines and the difference between instrumental and hedonic reinforcers; furthermore, it greatly over values the power of intrinsic reinforcement contingencies in OBM.

Introduction

I seem to be defining much of my recent career in terms of a dialog with Scott Geller and his colleagues, as this is my fourth article in that dialog (Malott, 2001, 2002-d, 2002-e). The dialog addresses two issues—the role of cognitive psychology in behaviorally based performance management and the role of aversive control in that performance management. The context has been behavior-based safety interventions, more generally, organizational behavior management, and now even more generally performance management of normal, verbal adults.

In this article, I will first review the three-contingency model of performance management and its implications for the necessity of subtle aversive control in even the most positive of performance-management contingencies. Then I will address Wiegand and Geller’s criticism of this approach. And finally I will comment on the achievement-motivation and self-worth theories those authors advocate.

The Three-contingency Model of Performance Management
and the Necessity of Aversive Control

The three-contingency model of performance management deals with the management of the behavior of verbal human beings, typically normal adults (Malott, 1992, 1993 October; Malott, Malott, & Shimamune, 1993; Malott, Shimamune, & Malott, 1993; Malott & Suarez-Trojan, 2004).

The Ineffective Natural Contingency

The first of the three contingencies is the ineffective natural contingency, the contingency we wish controlled behavior but fails to do so.

Small but Cumulatively Significant Outcomes
The most common reason such contingencies fail to control is that the size of the outcome of any single instance of the behavior of interest is too small to support or suppress that behavior, though the cumulative outcome of many such instances is significant.

For example, one instance of routine maintenance of a machine will have little effect, but the cumulative effect of regular maintenance over a period of time might greatly reduce machine failure, increase machine safety, and extend the life of the machine. Because one single instance of regular maintenance has only a trivial effect, people often fail to maintain equipment reliably. In other words the outcome of any single instance of machine maintenance is too small to support that behavior, though the cumulative outcome of many such instances is significant. Therefore, implicit, if not explicit, performance management is needed to insure reliable machine maintenance. (An example of implicit performance management would be, I will be very disappointed in you, if you turn out not to responsible enough to take care of your equipment; whereas an example of explicit performance management would be, You will lose your weekly proactivity bonus, if don’t maintain your equipment.)

Similarly, one instance of working in an ergonomically incorrect manner will have little effect, but the cumulative effect of poor work ergonomics over a period of time can be crippling. In other words the outcome of any single instance of ergonomically incorrect work is too small to suppress that behavior, though the cumulative outcome of many such instances is significant. Therefore, implicit, if not explicit, performance management is needed to insure a reliable, ergonomically correct work style.

Of course, when the natural outcome of any one instance of behavior is significant, rules describing the natural contingency will effectively control that behavior, even if that significant, natural outcome is delayed. For example, you will always bring your laptop computer in from the sun deck at the end of the day, when a rain storm is due in a few hours.

Improbable but Significant Outcomes
The other reason some natural contingencies are ineffective is that the probability of the outcome of any instance of the behavior of interest is too small to reinforce or punish that behavior, though the size of the outcome is significant when it does occur. This sort of ineffective natural contingency is most common in areas of safety.

For example, one instance of putting on safety equipment, such as a hard hat will probably have no beneficial effect, because the probability is very low that it would be needed. In other words, the probability of benefiting from any one instance of putting on the hard hat is too small to support that behavior, though the benefit may be life saving when the need for the hard hat arises. Therefore, implicit, if not explicit, performance management is needed to insure reliable use of safety equipment, even though failing to use the safety equipment might result in serious injury.

And one instance of grabbing a misplaced part from the closing jaws of a press might have a low probability of injury. In other words, the probability of harm resulting from any one instance of grabbing a misplaced part is too small to suppress that behavior, though the harm may be tragic when it does occur. Therefore implicit, if not explicit, performance management might be needed to reliably prevent such risky behavior, even though that behavior could result in serious injury.
Of course,, when the probability of injury is high, rules describing the natural contingency will effectively control using safety equipment, for example, buckling up and putting on a helmet before driving in an auto race.

The Irrelevance of the Delay of the Outcome

There is considerable confusion in behavior analysis, as well as in the general public concerning the relevance of the delay of the outcome. Part of the behavior-analytic confusion may come from a simplistic extrapolation from the rat in the Skinner box to the verbal human being in everyday life. The delay is crucial for reinforcement and punishment, both for the rat and for the person; there is little evidence, for either species, that reinforcement or punishment will occur if the outcome is delayed by more than 60 seconds. But, in all of the examples we just considered, if the outcome were both sizeable and probable, and if the person knew the rule describing the contingency involving that outcome, that rule would most certainly control the person’s behavior, regardless of the delay.

Suppose the person knows that if he fails to oil the press today, or if he fails to put on his hard hat today, or if his next move is un-ergonomic, or if he grabs that one misplaced part, then a million dollar machine will be destroyed, or he will be permanently injured; however, further suppose that this disastrous outcome will not occur until exactly one year from now. All but the most bizarre of accident-ophiles who would behave safely. Rules control our behavior when the outcome is sizeable and probable, regardless of the delay. As suggested previously, the reason rules describing some contingencies are ineffective is that the outcomes of those contingencies are too small or too improbable, not because they are too delayed.

The Performance-management Contingency

An Ineffective, Traditional Approach to Performance Management
A traditional but misguided approach to performance management is the informational/motivational approach. This intervention consists of describing the natural contingency to the person, with great emphasis on the seriousness of the consequence, like showing pictures of auto-crash victims who failed to put on their seat belts or pictures of lungs whose owners had smoked cigarettes for 40 years. Such techniques involve attempts to increase the apparent aversiveness of the outcomes. But, usually they will have little more than a momentary effect, if the natural contingency involves either an improbable or a small outcome for each individual response though the outcomes might be cumulatively significant. And if the outcome is both probable and sizeable, the intervention may often be unnecessary, because the person already knows the rule, and that rule already controls the person’s behavior.

An Effective Contingency-Management Approach to Performance Management
Instead of using the traditional, informational/motivational approach, the performance manager must supplement the ineffective natural contingency with an effective performance-management contingency. Most behavior-analytically based performance-management contingencies involve an added reinforcer, an incentive. For example, consider the use of an incentive intervention to improve job performance in a manufacturing plant (Jessup & Stahelski; 1999):

The ineffective natural contingency was that, each instance of carefully baking a carbon anode would prevent only an infinitesimal increase in rejects and would prevent only an infinitesimal decrease in company productivity, though many instance of careful baking would prevent significantly fewer rejects and prevent significantly less decrease in productivity (see the first contingency in Figure 1).

Figure 1. The Three-Contingency Model of Performance Management

Jessup and Stahelski used a group performance-management contingency for the 15 employees involved in baking the anodes: If the average rejection rate was less than 60 per week for 13 consecutive weeks, the employees would and did receive dinner for the entire group (see the second contingency in Figure 1).

The result was that the workers decreased the rejection rate of baked carbon anodes from 142 to 59 per week for a cost savings between $11,200 and $16,900 per week.

The Relevance of the Delay of the Outcome: Reinforcement vs. Analogs to Reinforcement
Now, at first glance, this might seem like reinforcement: Working carefully for 13 weeks would be reinforced by the group dinner. However, this is not reinforcement. The delay between the last careful anode-baking response and the delivery of the presumed reinforcer, the group dinner, was certainly greater than 60 sec; therefore, the group dinner could not have reinforced that response. And, of course, the dinner could not have reinforced careful anode-baking 13 weeks earlier. Nor is it reasonable to invoke a 13-week response chain, with its many weekend and bed-time interruptions.

Note that it is important to distinguish between the reinforcer and reinforcement: The reinforcer is the stimulus, event, or condition that increases the frequency of a response class it immediately follows; presumably the reinforcer is the group dinner. But reinforcement is the procedure and process of increasing the frequency of that response class because a reinforcer immediately followed a member of that response class. And a reinforcement contingency, is the contingent presentation of a reinforcer within 60 seconds of the causal response; the reinforcement contingency is responsible for the reinforcement process.

Of course, the group dinner is probably a reinforcer. And, the rule describing that reinforcer’s delayed, contingent presentation did increase the frequency of the relevant response class (careful anode baking). But the delayed careful-anode-baking => group-dinner contingency is not a reinforcement contingency. Superficially, it looks like a reinforcement contingency; and superficially, it acts like a reinforcement contingency; but, because of the delay, it is not a reinforcement contingency. Instead, it might be an analog to a reinforcement contingency. It might be analogous rather than homologous to reinforcement, because, as I will later suggest, the underlying processes for the analog contingency differ from the underlying processes for the reinforcement contingency.

The Relevance of Deadlines: Analogs to Reinforcement vs. Analogs to Avoidance
But, the real-world is even more complex than we have thus far considered. In the real world, we usually work under either explicit or implicit deadlines. And deadlines make a big difference. The diode contingency involved a 13-week deadline. If the workers failed to get their average rejection rate bellow 60 per week, by the deadline, they would lose the opportunity for the group dinner.

To see the importance of the deadline, consider the contingency without the deadline: Whenever the workers accumulated 13 weeks of average rejection rates bellow 60 per week, they would get the group dinner. A high rejection rate for any one week would not be a big deal; they could always do better next week. As a result of the removal of the deadline, it might take them 26 weeks to accumulate the 13 weeks with a low average rejection rate; it might take even longer. They would have the opportunity for infinite procrastination: They could always wait another week before doing the hard work of careful, low-error anode baking. Without the deadline, this contingency is an analog to a reinforcement contingency.

But with the deadline contingency, a week’s procrastination can seriously decrease the chances of getting the group dinner; with the deadline, there is little room for procrastination. And the deadline makes this an analog to an avoidance contingency—avoidance of the loss of the opportunity to receive a reinforcer (the group dinner).

The contingencies most often studied in the Skinner box are reinforcement contingencies. And, to my knowledge, there have been no Skinner-box studies of avoidance of the loss of a reinforcer, let alone avoidance of the loss of the opportunity to receive a reinforcer. But reinforcement contingencies are not the effective performance-management contingency most often used in organizational-behavior management to increase or maintain performance. Instead, the most-often-used contingency is an analog to avoidance of the loss of the opportunity to receive a reinforcer, because the effective performance-management contingency usually has either an implicit or explicit deadline.

Here is another example of an explicit-deadline contingency: a specified amount of work must be accomplished by a deadline, in order to receive a reinforcer, such as a bonus, points toward a backup reinforcer, or praise and recognition. That work might involve meeting a sales or production quota or completing a project. Failure to do the work by the deadline would result in loss of the opportunity to receive the reinforcer. If the delivery of the reinforcer is delayed, as it often is, then this is an analog to avoidance of the loss of the opportunity to receive a reinforcer.

But, if there were no deadline, then the contingency would be an analog to reinforcement, with the accompanying fatal prospect of infinite procrastination, a common result when there is no deadline.

In summary of this section, because of the necessity of deadlines, analogs to the avoidance of the loss of the opportunity to receive a reinforcer are the most common, effective performance management contingency used to increase or maintain behavior in OBM. And the loss of the opportunity to receive a reinforcer is an aversive event or condition. Thus aversive control is necessary in the management of performance in OBM, even when the incentive is nothing but reinforcers.

Explicit vs. Implicit Deadlines
An explicit deadline is one where the deadline is indicated in the rule describing the contingency. However, deadlines are often implicit and thus easily ignored by behavior analysts, though not by the people whose behavior is involved. Here is an example of an implicit-deadline contingency: The supervisor walks around the shop floor once a week dispensing some sort of reinforcer whenever she sees a worker wearing the proper safety equipment. In this case, failure to have donned the safety equipment before the deadline, the time of the supervisor’s visit, would result in loss of the opportunity to receive that reinforcer. This is avoidance of the loss of the opportunity to receive a reinforcer. Such a contingency is usually an analog contingency because in OBM the outcome is usually delayed; however, if the outcome were immediate praise, the contingency would be a direct-acting avoidance-of-the-loss contingency, not an indirect-acting analog.

To make the aversive nature of that loss more obvious, suppose the dispensed reinforcer were $1,000. The loss of the opportunity for the $1,000 reinforcer should now be clearly aversive, a loss we would all be motivated to avoid, with no procrastination. On the other hand, if the supervisor stopped by every minute or so, then the contingency is much closer to reinforcement (or its analog): If the worker fails to put on the safety equipment before this visit, no big deal; he can always put it on before the next visit, a minute or so later. And, if not then, still later, which, depending on the immediacy of the need for the $1,000 and the difficulty of putting on the safety equipment, could again result in significant procrastination.

And the immediacy of the need for the reinforcer raises the possibility of another type of implicit deadline. Suppose the worker will be allowed to receive only one $1,000 reinforcer. And suppose he will receive that reinforcer whenever he completes a difficult, effortful task. Then this is either a reinforcement contingency or its analog. Now also suppose that the worker’s checking account is so fat that he has no immediate need for that $1,000 reinforcer. Then, depending on the difficulty and effortfulness of the task, considerable procrastination may result. In fact, the worker may not be motivated to complete the task until a need for the $1,000 is eminent. For example, suppose his checking account has dwindled to the point that if he doesn’t come up with $1,000 to make the next payment on his new Audi A8, the car will be reposed. Now we have a serious deadline, repossession time, and, therefore, an effective analog to avoidance of the loss of the opportunity to receive a reinforcer, the $1,000, and avoidance of the loss of a reinforcer, the Audi A8. We also have the end of procrastination. This illustrates the other sort of implicit deadline, the time when the reinforcer is needed.

In case this example seems too artificial, let me suggest that people with no immediate need for cash often fail to get our income tax report in by April 15, even though a sizeable rebate would result. We more reliably get the tax report filed, when a penalty-backed deadline is on the horizon.

Hedonic vs. Instrumental Reinforcers
The tax example also suggests why we human beings need deadlines in OBM settings and so many other real-world settings, though rats lead productive lives in Skinner boxes, even in the absence of looming deadlines: The rats work for what I call hedonic reinforcers, like food and water, whereas we human beings often work for what I call instrumental reinforcers, like money and grades. Hedonic reinforcers are reinforcers in their own right, without being instrumental (necessary) for achieving other reinforcers. However, instrumental reinforcers are only of value if they are instrumental in achieving other reinforcers. For example, lose change in a foreign currency is of little value, once we return home; we usually discard it, after it has cluttered our dresser for a few months; but we hold onto that change, when we are in the foreign country where it will be instrumental in our obtaining other reinforcers. In other words, we would have no need for deadlines if we were at 80% of our ad lib feeding weight and our behavior were being reinforced with Purina Ralston lab chow.

Potential reinforcement contingencies and their analogs seem to be ineffective when they involve instrumental rather than hedonic reinforcers. Thus a reinforcement-based performance-management contingency will not reliably prevent procrastination, if it is based on money reinforcers or some other token system. However, if we are hungry, as I now am; and, if we allow ourselves to have one bite of e-Bistro.com pizza each time we complete a sentence, as I am now doing, then we stop staring at the first sentence of this paragraph, as I was doing for 15 minutes, and start knocking out those sentences.

Learned and Unlearned Hedonic Reinforcers vs. Behavioral Inertia
Incidentally, one might ask why do I not cheat and eat the whole pizza without writing any sentences. The answer has to do with my Jewish mother (Malott, 2002-a, 2002-b, & 2002-c). And why do I continue writing long sentences, rather than short choppy ones, though short and choppy would allow me quicker access to the pizza? Largely because, once I start writing the sentence, my behavior is controlled by another hedonic reinforcer—seeing what I take to be a well-crafted sentence trickle out onto my computer screen.

Note that, while all instrumental reinforcers are learned reinforcers, not all hedonic reinforcers are unlearned reinforcers. The sight of the well-crafted sentence is a learned, hedonic reinforcer, although it is not powerful enough to overcome the first part of what I call behavioral inertia—the difficulty of starting new tasks; but it is powerful enough to support the second part of behavioral inertia—the somewhat lesser difficulty of stopping tasks once started. In other words, seeing the well-crafted sentence is not enough of a reinforcer to get me to start typing the sentence, but it is enough of a reinforcer to keep me at it until I am finished.

However, learned, hedonic reinforcers are not necessarily weak reinforcers; for example, attention, a smile, and praise are all such powerful reinforcers that they may be responsible for much of the pathological behavior we behavior analysts work to eliminate; and the smile and praise may also be the incentive responsible for why we work so hard at eliminating that pathological behavior. In other words, I think learned, hedonic, social reinforcers are what makes our world go around, even when those reinforcers are clearly not instrumental. (And with that, I just took my last bight of pizza and, once again, am in serious trouble, made more serious by being at the end of a paragraph.)

To summarize these sections on hedonic and instrumental reinforcers, I suggest that reinforcement contingencies with either unlearned or learned hedonic reinforcers can reliably control our behavior; but reinforcement contingencies with instrumental reinforcers can not, at least not without deadlines. And with a deadline, the reinforcement contingency becomes an avoidance-of-the-loss-of-a-reinforcer contingency. The same applies to rule-governed analog contingencies, where the outcome is too delayed to directly reinforce the causal response. (However, there is one small exception: Getting silverware, an instrumental reinforcer, can reinforce our asking for it, when we are hungry and need the silverware to eat the dinner set before us. In other words, reinforcement will occur with instrumental reinforcers that provide immediate access to hedonic reinforcers, when the relevant motivating [i.e., establishing] operation is present for the hedonic reinforcer.)

The Inferred Direct-acting Contingency

Most performance-management contingencies in OBM involve rule-governed, analogs to direct-acting behavioral contingencies. They are analog contingencies because their outcomes are usually too delayed to reinforce or punish the causal response. And yet they can effectively control behavior, but only if the person or someone else states the rule describing that contingency. If Jessup and Stahelski had failed to tell the workers the rule describing their 13-weeks-of-careful-anode-baking-gets-a-group-dinner contingency, no doubt the workers would have failed to reduce their error rate enough to warrant publication of the results in JOBM.

It is so obvious that the workers must know the rules describing such analog contingencies, if those OBM contingencies are to control their behavior, that we would be more than justified in firing any manager or researcher who failed to tell the workers those rules. This is true even though we would also be justified in firing any researcher who did tell the rats in the Skinner box the rules describing their contingencies.

Though the need for rules describing these OBM contingencies is obvious, the behavioral processes underlying the function of those rules may be less obvious. I suggest that the statement of the rules function as an analog to a pairing procedure that causes failure to behave in accord with those rules to become an aversive condition. For example, If I fail to bake this anode carefully, I will risk causing my coworkers and me to lose the opportunity for the group dinner. The statement of this rule verbally pairs failing to bake this anode carefully (originally a relatively neutral condition) with risk causing my coworkers and me to lose the opportunity for the group dinner (an aversive condition). The result is that verbal pairing causes failing to bake this anode carefully to become a learned aversive condition for the worker, just like pairing the buzzer with the shock in the Skinner box, causes the originally neutral buzzer to become a learned aversive condition.

And, if the worker describes his own behavior as failing to bake this anode carefully (a learned aversive condition), he may escape that learned aversive condition be baking the anode carefully and thereby avoid the risk of causing the coworkers and himself to lose the opportunity for the group dinner (an aversive condition), just like the rat may press the lever that escapes the buzzer (a learned aversive condition) and thereby avoid the shock (an unlearned aversive condition).

Note that starting to bake the anode carefully immediately escapes the aversive condition I’m failing to bake this anode carefully and thereby reinforces careful anode baking, thus explaining how rules describing indirect-acting delayed outcomes can invoke contingencies with immediate outcomes that directly control our behavior.

To bring this closer to the academic home of many of you procrastinating readers, and to highlight the importance of the deadline, consider the common occurrence of approaching a task’s deadline with the task undone, not even started. You say the rule to yourself, I’m not working on the task; so I’m at risk of missing the deadline and being in serious trouble. And the closer you get to that deadline, the higher the risk and, therefore, the more aversive that self-statement of the rule becomes, until you reach a level of unbearable aversiveness and you start to work on the task, immediately reducing but probably not completely removing your current state of aversiveness (conveniently called fear). And that immediate reduction of fear (aversiveness, if you must) reinforces the escape response of working on the task and helps avoid the more distant outcome of being in serious trouble. The deadline is crucial, because without the deadline, the self-statement describing your being off task would often not be aversive enough to reinforce the escape response of getting on task (see the third contingency in Figure 1).

Figure 1. The Three-Contingency Model of Performance Management

So, just as Mower (1947) used his two-factor theory of avoidance to account for the processes underlying the effectiveness of avoidance contingencies in basic animal research, so can we use a version of that two-factor theory to account for the processes underlying the effectiveness of performance-management contingencies involving analogs to the avoidance of the loss of reinforcers in OBM. One “process” is the indirect-acting analog to the avoidance contingency (the performance-management contingency), and the more fundamental process is the direct-acting escape contingency.

The Jewish-Mother Syndrome

However, there is one element missing from the three-contingency model of performance management—the Jewish mother, the early childhood influence with unreasonably high performance standards, who would never let herself or her children off the hook, never let anyone cop out on following the right rules, on doing the right thing, never let anyone procrastinate (Malott, 2002-a, 2002-b, & 2002-c). But there is great variation in the extent to which we have had effective Jewish mothering; and, therefore, there is great variation in how close we get to the deadline, before fear of being in serious trouble ramps up enough to motivate our making the escape response of getting on task. Because of your early childhood training, some of you get into an unreasonable panic, as soon as the task is assigned, and thereby get everything done on time and usually ahead of time. Others of us maintain an unreasonable cool, until it is too late to meet the deadline; therefore we rarely get anything done on time, if done at all. But most of us are in the mediocre middle, not overwhelming successes but not complete failures.

What the performance-management contingency does is compensate for inadequate Jewish mothering. The less Jewish mothering, the tighter the performance-management contingency must be, with more frequent deadlines, correspondingly smaller tasks per deadline, and perhaps more sizeable outcomes, though more frequent deadlines with smaller tasks per deadline is probably more important than the size of the outcomes. However, there is nothing natural about performance-management contingencies; even the tightest of these rule-governed analog contingencies requires at least a modicum of early-child Jewish mothering. Absent that crucial behavioral history and the resultant set of fears, the performance manager needs to make the immediate delivery of M&Ms contingent on each response.

Wiegand and Geller’s Critique of Aversive Control in OBM

Wiegand and Geller (this issue) criticized the implications the three-contingency model, the implication that aversive control is not only pervasive but also crucial in OBM. And though they seem to argue that aversive control is not crucial to effective performance management, they seem mainly to argue that aversive control is just plain bad. I will now try to address those arguments.

The Jewish Mother Syndrome

Geller is comfortable with my use of the Jewish mother metaphor, as long as I keep it as an inside joke, restricted to the pages of JOBM, fearing that if the Jewish mother gets out of her bag, she will be bad PR for OBM (Geller, 2002). However my experience has been just the opposite: The great majority of undergraduate and graduate students and participants in OBM workshops with whom I have worked have not been indoctrinated with the sort of flower-child fear of the fall out of aversive control that is so prominent in many traditional behavior analysts. And those people with whom I have worked appreciate the more realistic analysis of behavior that addresses the importance of aversive control in everyday life and in performance management as opposed to the unrealistic, simplistic extrapolations from the reinforcement contingency of the Skinner box. In fact I presented my behavior analysis of the crucial importance of the Jewish Mother Syndrome to NYSABA at a conference near the Catskills to an audience that was mainly Jewish mothers or children of Jewish mothers (Malott, 2002-c); and they were far from offended; they laughed at the all the jokes, said the analysis was right on, and most importantly, said it was kosher.

Furthermore, I have seen no evidence that I or my students have perpetrated the “serious societal harm” that Geller fears will result from my “potentially dangerous message about negative reinforcement.” (Geller, 2002, p. 119); my students and I are a gentle, fun loving group of behavior analysts. And I would be curious to know if he has detected any creeping sadism infecting his lab, since “the ‘Jewish Mother Syndrome’ has been added to the verbal repertoire” of those who work there (Geller, 2002, p. 120).

On Loving Aversive Control

I am not saying we should use the cattle prod in place of M&Ms or smiley faces. What I am saying is that, in OBM, we usually use outcomes that are delayed rather than immediate and reinforcers that are instrumental rather than hedonic. And under those conditions, if we wish to increase or maintain performance, the performance-management contingencies must have deadlines, to prevent procrastination. And deadlines always convert analogs to reinforcement into analogs to avoidance, and avoidance always involves aversive control.

However, aversive control does not mean an aversive life. Every time you walk through a doorway your behavior is under the control of avoidance/punishment contingencies. Otherwise, you would eventually be black and blue and broken. But the walk through the doorway is not normally experienced as aversive because the avoidance responses are so easy to make and any single aversive outcome is so minimally aversive. However if you are doing plumbing work cramped under the kitchen sink and are constantly whacking your head on the bottom of the sink and your knuckles on the wrench, we’re talking really aversive.

And every time you drive to work your behavior is under the control of avoidance/punishment contingencies. Otherwise, you would be dead by now. But that drive is not normally experienced as aversive, unless, of course you are driving on I94 into Detroit or Chicago during rush hour, where the probability of a serious accident is aversively high.

So the goal of the performance manager who wants to be both effective and humane is to use deadlines that are frequent, with tasks that are easily performed, and outcomes that are small, so that working under the performance-management contingencies is as delightful as a leisurely drive down a country lane.

Wiegand and Geller’s Critique of Aversive Control—The Details

Wiegand and Geller say, “It is surprising (i.e.., disappointing) to learn of such strong support for negative reinforcement (i.e., aversive control) from an astute and experienced behaviorist (i.e., Malott)” (Wiegand & Geller, this issue). I think they are wrong about the disappointing part but on the mark about the astute part.

Radical Behaviorism
They gone on to say, “Such a stance flies in the face of radical behaviorism (as well as basic OBM philosophy)…” I think they define radical behaviorism too broadly by implying that everything Skinner says defines radical behaviorism. I suggest that, instead radical behaviorism is a philosophical point of view Skinner developed in arguing that private events are a legitimate domain of inquiry for the science of behavior analysis, even though the methodological behaviorist’s can not obtain inter-observer reliability measurements for such events (Skinner, 1953, p. 257-282). Even Skinner sometimes used his own term a little too loosely in talking about a radical behavioral approach to basic animal research. Furthermore, I think most behavior analysts use the term a little too loosely in fashionably identifying themselves as radical behaviorists when they are really methodological behaviorists who would breakout in hives if they got with in ten feet of a private event. Radical behaviorism is too important a concept to allow it to degenerate into the role of fashionable synonym for behavior analysis.

Forbid Topics for Societal Good?
And Geller (2002, p. 119) says that stressing the necessity of aversive control “sends a potentially dangerous message about negative reinforcement that could cause serious societal harm.” To me, that is a little like warning, if we talk about the importance of positive reinforcement, then we will interfere with people’s free will and make them dependent on reinforcers, like denying operant conditioning and determinism will give the people more freedom and dignity. I am not advocating spouse abuse. I am simply describing the way both natural and effective performance-management contingencies work. And, in fact, I think serious professional and societal harm does result from a superficial analysis of these contingencies based on simplistic extrapolation from basic animal research.

Freedom Now?
Wiegand and Geller say, “B. F. Skinner himself warned against the use of negative reinforcement, stating it interferes with one’s sense of freedom (Skinner, 1971).” But, I think what Skinner warned against was the use of punishment contingencies, not negative reinforcement (escape) contingencies, though that is a technical quibble, as the spirit of his argument was against aversive control, which would include both punishment and escape contingencies. However, I think his opposition to aversive control was not in order to maintain a reinforcement-generated sense of freedom, because being a determinist, he considered freedom an illusion beyond which he wished us to go. (Incidentally, I use the term escape contingency, rather than negative reinforcement contingency, because most laypeople and a few behavior analysts confuse negative reinforcement with punishment. And I will use aversive control to encompass escape, avoidance, and punishment.)

Again, when most behaviorists, not just Skinner, have argued against aversive control they have argued against the use of punishment contingencies, though they might have felt the same about escape contingencies; it may just be that the role of escape and avoidance contingencies in performance management was less clear and therefore of less concern.

Punishment
However, even when sophisticated behavior analysts have argued against the effectiveness of punishment contingencies, their arguments have been disappointingly unsophisticated and unempirical, often based on poor, asymmetrical illogic and the old Skinner (1938) punishment experiment using a brief 10-minute phase of mild punishment (the pressed lever would slap up against the rat’s paws). This brief, mild punishment contingency failed to reduce the total amount of responses in 220 minutes of extinction. Those arguing against the effectiveness of punishment ignore a large amount of subsequent empirical data showing that continual punishment with a sufficiently intense aversive stimulus can, of course, permanently reduce the rate of responding (Azrin, 1960). And, of course, punishment is even more effective, if an alternative response will produce the same reinforcer as the punished response (Azrin & Holtz, 1966).

The poor, asymmetrical illogic is that punishment contingencies (and presumably escape contingencies) are only temporarily effective because, when you remove the contingencies, the response rate will recover to baseline rate; therefore punishment contingencies are inferior to positive reinforcement contingencies. And the unempirical, illogical implication is that when you remove reinforcement contingencies, the behavior will not return to baseline, will not extinguish. (Incidentally, these arguments were made well before the concept of the behavioral trap was conceived).

But not only does this asymmetrical illogic imply the denial of extinction following reinforcement, it also ignores the empirical data supporting the impressively long duration of resistance to recovery that can be obtained following the termination of a punishment contingency (Blount, Drabman, Wilson, & Stewart, 1982; Lane, Wesolowski, & Burke, 1989; Kushner, 1968; Sajwaj, Libet, & Agras, 1974). Furthermore, this asymmetrical illogic ignores the empirical data supporting the impressive persistence of avoidance responses, after the avoided event has ceased to occur (Solmon, Kamin, & Wynne, 1953).

Wiegand and Geller argue against the importance of deadline-generated aversive control in effective performance-management contingencies by saying, “This idea runs contrary to basic theory in applied behavior analysis (Daniels, 2000; Geller, 2001c, d), …. While it is true that Daniels and Geller criticize aversive control, it may not be true that they are the only ones to set the parameters of basic theory in applied behavior analysis.

But, more importantly, their “basic theory in applied behavior analysis” presents a more recent variation of the poor, asymmetrical logic just discussed: “… when people are working under the guise of negative reinforcement, they will tend to engage in only the minimum amount of behavior necessary to avoid the aversive consequences.” This erroneously implies that people will work well above the minimum, when the behavior is maintained by reinforcement-based performance-management contingencies.

Perhaps the authors were thinking about intrinsic or built-in contingencies, like the reinforcing value of completing a task, for example a beautiful painting or a well-written JOBM article. But even here, there is no reason to think people will work above the minimum required to produce that reinforcing outcome; and we would not necessarily want them to.

Or perhaps they were thinking about performance management procedures where the contingencies are based on the behavior of producing the outcome (based on the process) rather than on the outcome itself. Yes, then our tendency to do the minimum required can be a problem, if that minimum only meets the letter of the performance management contingencies and fails to meet the spirit of producing the desired outcome. But this problem will arise whether we use reinforcement-based performance-management contingencies or escape and avoidance-based contingencies.

Furthermore, as indicated earlier, both experimental and applied data contradict the argument suggesting the relatively transient nature of aversive control compared with positive reinforcement. In fact, punishment and avoidance procedures often maintain their effects long after those procedures have been terminated.

“Malott seems to be unaware of a wealth of literature (primarily in the field of education) spanning several decades of research on achievement motivation. … The lack of reference to this literature in Malott’s commentary implicates an important lesson for all of us in the fields of applied behavior analysis and OBM.”

First of all, Wiegand and Geller do a disservice to the fields of applied behavior analysis and OBM, when they use my functional illiteracy to implicate an important lesson, as I am not representative of the scholars in our field. Not only do I not read mentalistic research, I don’t even read behavioristic research; in fact the only thing I read is computer magazines and pornography, and even there all I do is look at the pictures.

But, Wiegand and Geller do us a service by calling our attention to the “wealth of literature … on achievement motivation . . .” However, we must approach this cognitivist literature cautiously. Which I will now attempt to do.

Introspective Behaviorism vs. Correlational Studies: Cognitive Motivational Theories

Need-Achievement Theory

Most of the work on Atkinson’s need-achievement theory dichotomizes people into those with a high need for achievement, a high hope for success, the winners, and those with a high fear of failure, the whiners (Covington & Omelich, 1991). And though more recent theorists have dealt with additional categories into which to classify people, these theorists all tend to reflect Atkinson’s orientation that achievement motivation causes us to go forth and conquer the world, whereas fear motivation causes us to crouch timidly in the corner; and that is why some people are winners and others losers (Covington & Omelich, 1979).

According to these theorists, all virtue goes to those with high hope for success, the success seekers: They are risk takers (which in this context seems to be considered good). They set realistic goals. They are intrinsically engaged, persistent, and self-confident. However, the failure fearers, the failure avoiders, have unrealistic achievement standards, doubt their ability, and self-criticize rather self-reward.

The extent to which we strive to achieve is a result of where we fall on this two-dimensional approach-avoidance continuum. And where we fall is a result of the emotional conflict set up by the inner war between our approach and avoidance tendencies.

Achievement Motivation: Ineffective Natural Contingencies vs. Insufficient Motivation
But like so much of cognitive psychology, achievement-motivation theory is essentially the simplistic misconceptions of the layman dressed up in Ph.D.’s clothing. Most laymen and all too many behavior analysts think that if a person does not do something, it is because they do not sufficiently value the outcome their actions would produce. So the ineffective lay intervention consists of the traditional but misguided motivational approach to performance management described earlier: Laymen try to increase the extent that the person values the outcome.

For example, if students fail to study hard and thereby fail to earn good grades, it looks like they do not value what they would learn from studying and they do not value the good grades. In other words, most laymen and all too many behavior analysts do not understand that failure to work effectively toward these goals is a result of the ineffective natural contingencies described earlier, not a result of a lack of appreciation of the value of the outcomes such effective work would produce.

So unfortunately, rather than implementing effective performance-management contingencies to supplement the ineffective natural contingencies, those responsible for helping high-risk students in the university bring in motivational speakers to convince those students that learning and good grades are of value; and the behavior analysts responsible for teaching all the students, both high and low risk, conveniently dismiss their poorer students as having other priorities than academic success.

But my informal surveys show that all students would love to get good grades in their courses—of course. Furthermore, detailed anonymous course evaluations consistently show that those students appreciate our effective performance-management contingencies that cause them to do the hard work needed to master the course objectives and get good grades. In other words, procrastination does not mean people do not care; they may care quite a bit. Procrastination just means people can not get their act together under the existing, ineffective, natural contingencies.

For another example, the person who consistently over eats and therefore is obese does not do so because he fails to value good health and a ripped body; he does so because the natural contingencies are ineffective. The extent to which the obese person cares should be apparent to all when that person goes to the extreme of submitting himself to gastric bypass surgery.

Or take this example: “Indeed, if we consider the unblushing promises of reward and the staggering nature of the rewards promised in the gospels, it would seem that Our Lord finds our desires not too strong, but too weak. We are half-hearted creatures, fooling about with drink and sex and ambition when infinite joy is offered us, like an ignorant child who wants to go on making mud pies in a slum because he cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday at the sea. We are far too easily pleased" (Lewis, 2001, p. 26).

In other words, theologians also make the mistake of believing that our settling for the devil’s distractions is because we fail to appreciate the value the Lord’s rewards, when the real problem is that the natural contingencies are ineffective in supporting our following the straight and narrow path to infinite joy, because each step produces too small a reinforcing outcome even though the culmination of all those steps would lead us to heaven’s gates.

Fear of Failure: Active vs. Passive Avoidance
Unfortunately, most, but not all, of the writing by cognitive-motivational theorists fails to distinguish between active avoidance and what used to be called passive avoidance. Passive avoidance results from punishment contingencies. Using this terminology, we would say the rat passively avoids pressing the lever, if in the past, that response has been punished by the contingent presentation of a shock; in other words, the rat no longer presses the lever.

But, currently, we tend to reserve avoidance for active avoidance. And active avoidance results from avoidance contingencies. So we would say, the rat presses the lever because lever pressing has previously prevented or avoided the onset of a shock.

Passive avoidance refers to the response suppression by punishment contingencies, while active avoidance refers to response support by avoidance contingencies. And the cognitive motivation theorists generally write as if the only effect of fear of failure is the suppression or punishment of behavior that should be occurring. For example, we fail to make the cold sales call we should make, for fear of rejection. However, cognitive motivation theorists tend to ignore the occasions when they should laud the suppressive effects of fear of failure, for example when fear of failure suppressed our investing in Enron. In other words, sometimes fear of failure is dysfunctional but often it is functional.

More importantly, cognitive motivation theorists usually overlook active avoidance behavior supported by fear of failure in the world of work, as well as almost every other world we live in; and this active avoidance behavior is crucial for our success, not to mention our survival. We put on a safety helmet, not to get a smiley face and feel good about ourselves, but to avoid closed-head brain injury. And we buckle up, not to get a smiley face and feel good about ourselves, but to avoid closed-head brain injury. And we stay up all night working on our JOBM article, not to get a smiley face and feel good about ourselves, but to avoid looking like the completely irresponsible slacker we know we really are. Contrary to the implications of cognitive motivation theorists, fear of failure is essential, if we are to maintain reasonable standards of safety, productivity, and quality. In other words, sometimes fear of failure is dysfunctional but often it is functional.

The Irrelevance of Cognitive Motivation Theories
The literature on achievement-motivation and self-worth theories seems largely irrelevant to everyday OBM, including behavioral safety. This literature tends to address whether or not someone will decide to go to college or flip burgers at McDonalds or write the great American rock opera, not whether they will put on their safety goggles, buckle up, get to work on time, or hide their rejected baked anodes to avoid losing their low-rejects bonus. It is not that this literature is irrelevant to life or to areas that OBM should eventually address, but it seems irrelevant to turn-of-the-century JOBM.

For example, I hope no cognitive-motivational theorist would suggest that workers fail to put on safety goggles because of fear of failure. And I hope no cognitive motivational theorist would be too critical of me for not wanting to cross the street on crutches in heavy traffic, though my reluctance is clearly a result of my fear of failure.

Self-worth Theory

Self-approval and/vs. Social approval
According to self-worth theorists, self-acceptance is the highest human priority; we work to avoid losing it and we work to build it (Covington & Roberts, 1994, p. 161). And I think that’s close to on the mark. Of course, from a behavior-analytic perspective, one of the main reasons self-worth is such a powerful learned reinforcer is because self-worth or self-approval is paired with social approval. In other words, mommy said, Dick is cool and gave me a cookie, making Dick is cool one of my greatest learned reinforcers, whether she says it or you say it (social approval), or whether I say it (self-approval). So self-approval, or self-acceptance, is one of my greatest learned reinforcers, if not my highest human priority. And I presume to speak for all humanity.

But there are weird, sick little twists in our value system. For example there have been a couple of famous cases where runners have taken the taxi for part of the Boston Marathon, thereby greatly improving their time and position in the finishers’ list, not enough to win anything, but enough to give themselves considerable bragging rights back home. In other words, social approval wins out over self-approval: I may be a cheating scum bag, but everyone else things I’m great; and that’s good enough for me. Amazing.

For others of us, self-worth or self-esteem or self-approval is more a function of living up to our own standards of moral, personal, and professional performance than it is a function of earning social approval, though praise from others is lovely and scorn or rejection by others is painful. So, self-approval may win out over social approval, even though we are also social-approval junkies, even though we will strive for the approval of those whose opinion we have no reason to respect, and even though we are crushed by the rejection and disapproval of those same people. For example, picking up a smiling baby and having the infant immediately start crying and screaming is a most horrible rejection, even though that baby is in no position to judge our true worth. None-the-less, social-approval junkies though we are, at least sometimes our own self-approval can be more valuable to us than the approval of the screaming baby or the screaming colleague. As Cyrano de Bergerac said, All the money and approbation from a wealthy patron is nothing compared to the reinforcing value of one honest line from one of my own poems, or words to that effect.

However, the cognitive-motivational theorists seem to place more emphasis on self-worth as a result of self-evaluation of our own abilities and accomplishments than as a result of the evaluation of others (Covington & Omelich, 1991). In behavior-analytic terms, positive self-evaluation (self-worth) becomes such a powerful reinforcer because of its pairing with the instrumentality of our skills in successfully producing other hedonic reinforcers. Thus stimuli arising from behaving skillfully, and therefore successfully, become powerful learned reinforcers, so powerful that many of us have wasted hours at a time on dumb computer games like Tetris, lining up the blocks properly before they hit the floor, just because we can pick up those cheap, but powerful, skill reinforcers, those self-worth reinforcers. So, from a more general view, self-worth becomes and remains even more powerful because of its continued pairing with skill-produced reinforcers as well as social reinforcers.

Shame, Humiliation, and Guilt
Cognitive-motivational theorists address the issue of our self-worth as a function of our success and failure at doing what we should do. And, in that context, they address shame, the important generic concept that encompasses humiliation, the learned aversive consequence of trying hard but failing because you are incompetent, and guilt, the learned aversive consequence of not trying hard enough, not giving it your best shot (Covington & Omelich, 1985).

Incidentally, while most behaviorists may flinch at shame, humiliation, guilt, and fear, and while there may be no differentiated physiological or subjective reaction associated with the experience of each of these “emotions,” the terms can be quite useful in calling attention to the different types of environmental conditions that evoke a learned aversive condition.

And, according to my introspective behavioral theory of motivation, the aversiveness of each of those types of shame depends on the extent to which our Jewish mother has put guilt trips on us when we have not tried hard enough and the extent to which she has humiliated us when we have tried but failed.

Although the cognitive motivational theorists address the preceding use of the term guilt, they do not address another, equally important, use of the term guilt—the learned aversive consequence of doing something you should not do, like taking a taxi for half the Boston marathon or hiding the rejected baked anodes to avoid losing the low-rejects bonus. And again, this guilt is also a function of our behavioral histories, the history of our Jewish mother pairing inappropriate behavior with aversive morality lectures. In general, these cognitive-motivational theorists seem to be concerned with what motivates us to do or not do what we should do, while they seem to ignore what motivates us to do or not do what we should not do.

Malott’s Three-dimensional Need-achievement Model.
Though most of the research on Atkinson’s need-achievement theory has been on a one-dimensional version of his two-dimensional model, a close look at the one-dimensional version, suggests that version is logically flawed. On one end of the presumed dimension is high hope for success (i.e., high expected probability of success), with high fear of failure (i.e. high aversiveness of failure) on the other end. But hope for success and aversiveness of failure do not fall on the same dimension. Low hope for success should be on the other end of a hope dimension, with low fear of failure on the other end of a fear dimension. Otherwise, it is like trying to construct a single dimension with red on one end and big on the other. It doesn’t work.

The importance of this confusion about dimensions becomes clearer when we consider Covington and Omelich’s (1991) elaborate of Atkinson’s original two-dimensional model for classifying people according to their need for achievement. One dimension is hope for success, going from high to low, with the other dimension being fear of failure of failure, also going from high to low, so that a person could be high in hope for success and low in fear of failure, high in hope and also high in fear, etc.

However, there is a third, relevant dimension, one this model ignores; but the ambiguity of the terms hope and fear make that third dimension difficult to spot. As these theorists use hope and fear, they mean expected probability for hope and value or amount of aversiveness for fear. Though at first glance, it might appear that they are using fear to mean an expected low probability of success; they aren’t. The missing dimension is amount of the reinforcing value of success. So that when we use Figure 2 to categorize someone, we might say the person has high expectation of the likelihood of success and also high fear of failure (failure is highly aversive), but we do not know how much the person values success. For example, the person might have high expectation of the likely hood of success and high fear of failure (failure is highly aversive) and either put a high value or a low value on success. In other words, fearing failure and valuing success can be along two independent dimensions. So, the extent to which the person values success, the extent to which success is a reinforcer, might then be crucial in determining whether the person (or organism) responds. For example, if the rat presses the lever, it will get either food (success) or shock (failure). Whether or not the rat presses the lever is a function not only of the probability of getting the food and the intensity of the shock, as in Atkinson’s two-dimensional model, but also a function of the amount of the food (incentive) or the amount of food deprivation (motivating operation), as in the three-dimensional model.

Now, while this is a serious theoretical omission, I am not sure it is a serious practical omission. People obviously vary greatly in the probability that they will succeed in accomplishing difficult tasks. And I think they vary greatly in the extent to which they fear the humiliation of failure, depending on the effectiveness of their Jewish mother. But, contrary to popular opinion, we all may be fairly homogeneous in the extent to which we value success. Our culture may have been effective in programming us all to highly value driving with our beautiful/handsome lover/spouse in our brand-new, 12-cylinder Italian Ferrari to commencement, where we will graduate summa cum laude, before flying our private jet to LA, where we will split our time between posing for Time magazine’s person-of-the-year cover, staring in United Artists’ much anticipated $500,000,000 mega-hit, which we also wrote and will direct, and recording our next sure-to-be-platinum hip-hop-klezmer album on our own indi label, our only problem being how we will find time for our trip to the Olympics, where we are expected to take home the gold. Yes, we may all be more or less alike in the extent to which we highly value that mix of reinforcers; but we all vary greatly in the extent to which we will succeed in even approximating those reinforcers, and we may also vary greatly in the extent to which we fear the humiliation of failing to achieve the attainment of those reinforcers. So, it remains to be determined whether practical differences in performance are also determined by value of success as well as hope for success and fear of failure.

(Incidentally, Figure 2’s representation of Atkinson’s two-dimensional need-achievement model differs significantly from Wiegand and Geller’s [this issue] Figure 1 quadripolar model of need achievement adopted from Covington [1992]. Their model is based on the following two dimensions: approaching success and avoiding failure; and often, though not always, those two dimensions can be independent and thus represented in a two-dimensional space. Furthermore, that is a useful way of looking at the implications of cognitive motivational theorizing, the implications for what the motivated person actually does. But, I think that diagram does not capture the essence of the actual theorizing those cognitivists did as well as does Figure 2 in the present article with its two dimensions of probability of success and aversiveness of failure.)

The Four Personality Types
Fear of failure. Covington & Omelich (1985) argue that by adulthood, we realize effort is not enough and ability is the big deal; therefore many people (e.g., their college-student subjects) fear failure because of the humiliation of not having enough ability to succeed more than they fear the guilt of not having given it their best shot (i.e., the aversiveness of this humiliation is greater than the aversiveness of this guilt). And, therefore, those adults procrastinate and fail to do what is necessary to succeed (e.g., fail to study enough for their upcoming exam), so they can avoid the humiliation of not having enough ability by coping out to the less aversive guilt of not having tried hard enough.

But, according to preschool fatalism, a cornerstone of my introspective-behavioral theory of motivation, the values we acquire as children tend to rule us the rest of our lives, in spite of our rational understanding of the irrationality of those values, and in spite of years trying to liberate ourselves from those values through talk therapy (psychoanalytic or rational-emotive). So, I doubt that there is a major shift in our humiliation/guilt balance, as we move into adulthood.
More importantly, I do not think people intentionally procrastinate and goof off because of fear of the failure-induced humiliation of not having enough skills, talent, or brains. We need not infer this sort of hidden psychodynamic motivation. Instead, the three-contingency model of performance management calls our attention to those old, familiar ineffective natural contingencies, with ineffectively small, but cumulatively significant outcome of starting to study for the exam right now--I’ll start as soon as Jay Leno’s show is over, if I’m not too sleepy by that time. At least some cognitive motivational theorists tend not to say the students do not value the knowledge, skills, good grades, and eventual good jobs that result from hard study.

Similarly, why do people not buckle up or mop up industrial spills, or do routine equipment maintenance, or bake the anodes carefully? I think not because of the cognitivist’s fear of the humiliating, low-ability implications of failure. Instead, I suggest they do not do all of those important things, because the natural contingencies are ineffective in supporting that behavior—one single instance of not doing the desired behavior probably won’t matter that much.

Covington & Omelich (1991) also say that people who take on more tasks than they can handle do so to provide an excuse for their failure; and they need this excuse because of their overwhelming fear of the humiliation of failure—The reason I failed is because I tried to do more than anyone could have done, not because I’m incompetent. Most people I know take on more than they can handle, but I think we do so more because of the social approval for saying yes, the social disapproval for saying no, greed, and unrealistic planning. Our plates are too full, simply because our eyes that are bigger than our tummies, not because of some hidden psychodynamic motivation.

But, again, it should be hard for even the most committed cognitive-motivational theorists to argue that people intentionally over commit so they can avoid the humiliation of not having the ability to buckle up, put on their hard hat, mop up the water spill, or squirt a little oil in the gears every few days.

In any event, according to the cognitive-motivational theorists, a high fear of failure is basically bad and accounts for why people actually fail. If those who fear failure did not fear failure, they would set more realistic achievement goals, would not procrastinate, would be confident about their abilities, and would be inclined more to self-reward rather than self-criticism, which they do excessively (Covington & Omelich, 1991).

Hope for success. While cognitive-motivational theorists consider a high fear of failure basically bad and the reason why people fail, they consider a high hope for success, basically good and the reason why people succeed. Those who anticipate success are realistic goal setters, willing to take risks, are motivated by the intrinsic reinforcers of doing the task, and are self-confident (Covington & Omelich, 1991). However, even to the extent that anticipating success may be correlated with actual success, the correlation is not necessarily a causal relation. In other words, if someone does not anticipate success, that may be more a function of realistic expectations than a result of a psychopathology. For example, at this point in my life, I would not anticipate much success, if I were to switch to ballet as a profession.

Success orienters. According to the cognitivsts, there are four basic types of people, corresponding to the four cells in Figure 2. Three types of people are losers and one type of people are winners. The winners are the success oriented, those who not only have high hope or expectation of success but also have low fear of failure (failure is not aversive for them). They have all the virtues attributed in the preceding paragraph to those with high hope for success.

I have known a lot of very successful people, both students and professionals. And many of them realistically anticipate success; a few may be realistic goal setters, though most bight off more than they can comfortably chew; some are willing to take risks and some are not, most enjoy the intrinsic reinforcers of their work; a few are self-confident to the point of offensive over confidence, whereas many are perpetually worried about their work.

Failure acceptors. Perhaps the worst kind of losers are the failure acceptors, people who have little hope for success but also do not find failure that aversive. However, Covington and Omelich (1991) seem reluctantly to admit that this may not be indicative of a pathological personality type or a cognitive-motivational flaw but rather a realistic assessment of low ability and a healthy adjustment to that unfortunate condition. They also admit that being a failure acceptor may not be a fundamental personality type but might be situational, much as I am a failure acceptor in the field of ballet though not in the field of behavior analysis. But to the extent that being a failure acceptor is a healthy adjustment to ones limitations, then it is probably not the cause of failure. And it certainly seems unlikely that the failure accepting personality is an explanation for why people fail to buckle up, wear their hard hats, etc.

Incidentally, Covington and Omelich (1991, p. 176) find that “failure-acceptors express as much ambition and desire to do well as do success-oriented individuals…” In other words, motivational lecturers stressing the benefits of success will not be an effective performance-management intervention for these maximally unsuccessful people; they already appreciate the value of being winners.

Failure avoiders. Though the failure acceptors may be the consummate losers, it is the failure avoiders who receive the bulk of the cognitivist scorn. These failure avoiders think they have little hope for success but find failure highly aversive. These are the ones who procrastinate and over commit and blame others, in order to maintain their self-worth (Covington and Omelich, 1991). They are unlikely to start tasks and unlikely to stick with those tasks they have started (Covington, & Roberts, 1994). Furthermore, they have this low rate of success in all areas of their life, not just one (e.g., school).

I agree that there are many people who have low productivity and low success in many or perhaps all areas of their lives. However, my observation is that rather than thinking they have little hope for success, they often have a naïvely high expectation of success, anticipating that it will take much less effort than it really does. In addition, their fear of failure does not kick in soon enough to get them started with the task in time to complete it with success. Again, they procrastinate because of ineffective natural contingencies, not to protect their self-worth. And the extent to which they blame others for their failure is a function of their reinforcement history in terms of escape from external blame and their history of external punishment for admission of culpability.

Overstrivers. Finally there is the group whom the cognitivists pejoratively label the overstrivers, in spite of the fact that they are bright, have good study skills, make good grades, are generally successful, and also have high hope for success (Covington & Omelich, 1991). In the cognitivists’ view, the fatal flaw of the “overstrivers” is that they find failure very aversive. So the cognitivists really go after them, even criticizing them for studying more than the success orienters, calling their study superficial, rote, meticulous over preparation, saying they are overly self-disciplined and have too many worries about the future.

Furthermore, all of this hard work is presumably because of their pathological motivation: their demonic drive to succeed, their anxiety about failure, their evaluation anxieties, the constant fear of failing to achieve their ultimate unrealistic goal—perfection, their intrapsychic conflict between approach and avoidance tendencies that is the cognitivist’s hallmark for overstrivers. And not only that, these “overstrivers” take health-risking tranquilizers, etc. to reduce their pre-exam stress (Covington & Omelich, 1991; Covington, & Roberts, 1994).

In defense of the “overstriver.” Well, the cognitivists dis all the people I love and respect—my best students, my most productive colleagues, and me. I do not know what world the cognitivists live in, but every productive person in my world is running scared, and people who are not running scared spend their lives vegging out in front of the TV.

A highly respected colleague once put it this way: I work on teaching my classes until the stack of requests for letters of recommendation gets so aversively high that I start writing them, until the stack of ungraded student papers gets so aversively high that I start grading them, until the stack of something else gets so aversively high, etc. (Jack Michael, personal communication, circa 1980).

Here’s another respected colleague’s view: She saw a Peking Opera juggler who strutted on stage in a white suit and black shirt and did a few cocky Saturday Night Fever disco poses. And then his lovely assistant pushed out a table with four plates on it. One at a time, she set all four plates simultaneously spinning on their edges. When the final plate started spinning, the first plate slowed down to the point that it was about to topple over. The juggler confidently set it spinning again and successively re-spun each of the remaining plates just as it was about to topple. He gave a cocky bow and then noticed that lovely assistant had just brought out another table and set four more plates spinning, greatly increasing the difficulty of the his task. And with increasing consternation, the juggler saw her bring out three more tables of spinning plates, until the harried man was rushing from one end of the table to the other, desperately keeping all 20 plates spinning. My respected colleague put it this way: That’s a perfect metaphor for the life of a successful professional (Maria Malott, personal communication, circa 1990).

Every successful professional I know is rushing from one tottering plate to another trying to avoid disaster. And like the rest of the cognitivists’ “overstrivers,” these highly successful people have only one secret—deadline-induced avoidance contingencies. None of them suffer the cognitivists’ “intrapsychic conflict between approach and avoidance tendencies.” That faulty analysis results from confusion between passive avoidance and active avoidance. Instead of being motivated by “intrapsychic conflict between approach and avoidance tendencies,” highly successful people are motivated by intrapsychic harmony between approach and approach tendencies—the reinforcer of a beautiful demonstration of 20 spinning plates and the reinforcer of having avoided some crashing plates. It would have been an approach-(passive) avoidance conflict, if beautiful assistant had kicked the juggler, each time he re-spun one of the plates; she did not. In sum, highly successful people concurrently approach success and avoid failure.

Success seeking will motivate me to commit to writing an article or making a PowerPoint presentation. But avoidance failure will motivate me to get around to doing the writing or preparing the PowerPoint, usually just after the last minute. And the large amount of intrinsic reinforcers involved in these tasks do not suffice unassisted by a kick in the rear from that looming deadline.

The value and limitations of intrinsic motivation. Again, like so much of cognitive psychology, the emphasis on intrinsic motivation (intrinsic reinforcement contingencies) is essentially the naïve, simplistic misconceptions of the layman dressed up in Ph.D.’s clothing. Most laymen and, again, all too many behavior analysts think it is a realistic goal to strive for a world where our behavior is maintained only by natural reinforcement contingencies involving intrinsic reinforcers, with none of those false, unnatural, Mickey-Mouse performance-management contingencies, and certainly none of those aversive contingencies with all their harmful fallout.

And, I agree that a world based only on intrinsic reinforcers would be wonderful; but I also think it is impossible to achieve. Furthermore, I think efforts to accomplish such a world have had more harmful consequences than all the fall out of the use of avoidance-based performance-management contingencies designed to maintain healthy, happy, productive behavior. For example, consider the A. S. Neal Summerhillian, non-coercive, free-education, do-only-what-feels-good educational systems so popular in the 60’s; that was an attempt to build an educational world solely based on intrinsic reinforcers, an attempt that, unfortunately resulted in students spending most of their time on arts and crafts and little time on the three r’s.

That does not mean I oppose the use of performance-management contingencies involving intrinsic reinforcers. In fact, since 1966, I have spent much of my life, with some success, carefully programming contingencies involving intrinsic reinforcers into textbooks, workbooks, multi-media presentations, PowerPoint presentations, PowerPoint programmed instruction, rat labs, autism practica, and structured seminars, with all of these of these contingencies designed to reinforcer observing responses, participation, and engagement in higher education.

These intrinsic reinforcers greatly enhance the student’s eagerness to participate in education; they greatly enhance the student’s eagerness to commit their lives to the field of behavior analysis; and they greatly enhance the social validity of the education systems in which they are embedded; but they are insufficient to maintain the hard work necessary to master the concepts and skills necessary to become a professional behavior analyst. For that we need a combination of avoidance-based performance-management contingencies and the Jewish mother.

Wallace’s (1977).article provides my favorite example of the inadequacy of intrinsic reinforcers to maintain the productive behavior of the creative genius. The article documents the extreme, coercive performance-management efforts self-imposed by authors like Hemingway, Trollope, Conrad, Maugham, Huxley, and Hugo because the intrinsic reinforcers were inadequate to the task. Overstrivers?

Furthermore, if you are sensitive enough, you can detect a stratosphere clogged with great poems, short stories, articles, and research ideas that contained enough intrinsic reinforcers to get their producers to create them in their heads, to air write them; but the intrinsic reinforcers were not great enough to get their producers to do the hard work of writing them down. Similarly, the world’s file cabinets are full of languishing first drafts of manuscripts on brittle, aging paper, first drafts that contained enough intrinsic reinforcers to get their producers to write them down; but the intrinsic reinforcers were not great enough to get their producers to do the hard work of revising them a dozen times and submitting them for publication. So don’t knock the over-striving innovators who approach success but simultaneously work their butts off to avoid their innovation’s failing to reach the fruition of implementation.

As Thomas Edison said, “Genius is one per cent inspiration (intrinsic reinforcers) and ninety-nine per cent perspiration (avoidance of failure) (Quotations, 2003).

Or as Spanish violinist and composer, Pablo Sarasate said, on being hailed as a genius by a critic, “A genius! For thirty-seven years I've practiced fourteen hours a day, and now they call me a genius! (Quotations, 2003).

In sum, intrinsic reinforcers are wonderful but far from sufficient to get all but the most trivial of jobs done.

Wiegand and Geller on “overstrivers.” Wiegand and Geller (this issue) say that “overstrivers” (a.k.a. highly effective people) score relatively low on tolerance. And that is consistent with my observations. “Overstrivers” often apply the same high, Jewish-mother standard to others that they apply to themselves, being no more tolerant of others than they are of themselves, and being shocked that others do not hold themselves to those same high standards, for example, being surprised that others are willing to come to meetings unprepared and thus inconvenience everyone else because of their own slothfulness. And I occasionally have to deprogram my most reliable, successful staff members to convince them that their Jewish-mother standards apply to themselves, but that they should not be angry with their peers who have not had the benefits of such effective mothering. Don’t get angry, get performance-management contingencies.

Wiegand and Geller also say that “overstrivers” are less than willing to comply with the wishes of others. And I think that can be true, for example, of people who are able to focus their efforts on becoming world-class experts. If everyone else wants to party, and the person needs to go to bed to be fresh for the four hours of daily practice needed to accumulate the 10,000 hours of deliberate practice need to be a world-class violinist, (Ericsson & Charness, 1994) that person will either have become insensitive to the frequently competing wishes of others or will not become a world-class violinist. And, if that person wants to become the editor of JABA he or she will insist on putting in the 70 weekly hours of work such an impressive achievement requires, restricting time with the spouse and kids to a small amount of really high “quality time.” That person will be working so hard at avoiding failure that he or she will sit in the back seat of the car, carefully editing JABA manuscripts, while the hosts drive him or her on the two-hour trip to the airport, rather than participating in the intrinsic reinforcers of normally obligatory chit-chatting social interactions. Some unwillingness to comply with the distracting wishes of others is what it takes to be a highly successful person.

Wiegand and Geller say that although the aversive escape/avoidance contingencies cause the “overstrivers” to succeed, the aversive contingencies are unpleasant. And I agree; that is the price of success. Those are the dues you pay, to become a world-class violinist or an editor of JABA, not that the person chooses to pay those dues for that success. The Jewish mother made that “choice” long ago; the adult is just successfully playing out the dance to mother’s childhood tune.

Wiegand and Geller say that, even if these people are successful, “they do not seem to be the type of person we would want on our work team, given the negative characteristics demonstrated by the research ….” Well, that’s the price of success, if you want a successful team; and I am absolutely certain that Geller has a successful team. So I would suggest that the recent adoption of the concept of Jewish mother syndrome in Geller’s lab might give him a hint as to a major motivating factor behind his team’s success.

Conclusion

Psychology has yet to free itself from its psychodiagnostic heritage. Psychologists, including cognitive motivational theorists, can not resist inventing dysfunctional categories into which they place people or labels they can apply to people. Psychologists can not resist designing tests to facilitate that placement, treating those categories and labels as reifications that cause behavior, and ignoring the complex, subtle interactions of historical and current contingencies that cause people to act in ways that will get them labeled high or low IQed, normal or autistic, overstrivers or success seekers. We all differ from each other in many complex ways. We have different behavioral histories and thus different values (reinforcers and aversive conditions) and different repertoires. And to force people into these pigeon holes may be of little analytical value even when there are some correlational clusters to rationalize those pigeon holes.

In conclusion, I think the cognitive motivational theorists do psychology a service by raising the issue of avoidance contingencies in human affairs, but I think they get it almost completely wrong in stressing the suppressive effects of passive avoidance or punishment contingencies and generally ignoring the beneficial effects of active avoidance. In addition, I think they do our field a service by formally raising the issue of intrinsic reinforcers in human affairs, but again I think they get it almost completely wrong in suggesting that intrinsic reinforcers are all we need.

At the end of my rants, I like to add: Of course, this is only my opinion; and I could be wrong, but probably not.

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